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ABSTRACT
Empirical work has documented the socio-economic characteristics
of immigrants who naturalise and the effects of naturalisation on
labour market outcomes. Political engagement and national
identity are, however, salient but understudied dimensions of
citizenship. Using two waves of the U.K. Household Longitudinal
Study, I investigate immigrants’ national identification and
political engagement before and after naturalisation. I find that
before naturalisation those who acquire citizenship are more likely
to identify as British, be familiar with the British political system
and are less interested in politics compared to those who do not.
I also find that after naturalisation, the importance of new citizens
give to their British identity is higher than before, but their
interest in politics is lower. I argue that citizenship retains its role
as a marker of national identity for immigrants and that the
negative association between naturalisation and interest in politics
for immigrants is compatible with the low political engagement of
the British-born population. I suggest that the further decline in
interest in politics following naturalisation may be explained by
immigrants’ disillusionment with a political narrative that fails to
include them. I reflect on the implications of my findings for the
conceptualisation of citizenship, for policy, and for future research.
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Introduction
Citizenship is a legal status that grants rights and obligations, it is national identity and it is
the status that gives us the power to act as political agents to govern the society we live in
(Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). Yet, national identity and political engage-
ment are understudied dimensions of citizenship in the context of naturalisation. We
do not know if national identity and political engagement are among the reasons why
immigrants naturalise and/or are affected by naturalisation.
Around 123,000 immigrants acquired British citizenship in 2017, putting the United
Kingdom (U.K.) in second place among European countries for the number of naturalis-
ations conferred (Blinder 2018; Eurostat 2019).1 This is despite the burdensome, complex
and expensive process required to naturalise. Concurrently, over the past two decades
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other forms of membership such as legal residence status, rather than citizenship, have
become critical in determining access to most social and civil rights and privileges in
the U.K. as in many other Western countries. The key tangible differences between resi-
dence and citizenship that endure are the right to vote in general elections,2 greater
freedom of movement and the permanence of the status, which governments revoke
only in extreme circumstances. Are these benefits the entire reason why over 100,000
immigrants acquire citizenship every year? The literature to date has focused on the bar-
riers and incentives defined by different naturalisation policies, and on documenting the
immigrants who naturalise with respect to their socio-demographic and socio-economic
profile. However, the story we know of who and why immigrants naturalise is incomplete.
Little has been said on whether national identification and being engaged with national
politics are motives for naturalising.
It is also worth asking if citizenship simply acknowledges immigrants who are already
de facto citizens or if it is also a means to shape them into citizens. Existing research shows
that once naturalised, immigrants may enjoy better wages and higher rates of employment
(e.g. Helgertz, Bevelander, and Tegunimataka 2014), but citizenship may also be a resource
that fosters other dimensions of integration, national identification, national attachment,
and political engagement.
In this paper, I further the understanding of the role citizenship has for immigrants by
considering two neglected, though integral, dimensions of citizenship, national identifi-
cation and political engagement. I use longitudinal data to measure immigrants’ identity
as British and political engagement before and after the acquisition of citizenship. In the
next section, I discuss the salience of these dimensions of citizenship within the British
context and the empirical evidence on the nexus between them and citizenship acquisition.
In the subsequent sections, I describe my data, samples and analytical approach. I follow
with a discussion of findings and conclusions.
Background
Citizenship
Modern scholars define citizenship in democracies as a status that grants civic, political
and social rights and responsibilities (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Carens
2000; Kymlicka and Norman 1994). Among these, the right to vote ensures political equal-
ity in the governing of a well-defined society. Citizenship is also sense of belonging to that
same society, that is identification with the nation-state and emotional attachment to the
community (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Yuval-Davis 2006). Such a
definition highlights how citizenship may not only have an instrumental value, but also
a sentimental and identitarian significance (Pogonyi 2019).
In Western countries, citizenship is the chief conferrer of rights and privileges, but the
distance from other forms of membership has lessened. It has become increasingly chal-
lenging to deny non-citizens civil and social rights that in the post-war era have become
associated with the individual, rather than the citizen (Soysal 2000). Alternative forms of
national and supra-national membership have developed in a context of economic and
cultural globalisation, with relevant cross-border institutions and increased mobility
resulting from more flexible borders. From an instrumental perspective, these other
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forms of status have become almost as important in assigning rights. With residence
permits, non-citizens enjoy the same rights as citizens, except for the right to vote in
general elections and greater freedom of movement. The European Union is also a
supra-national institution that ensures social and civil rights to all its citizens, beyond
their national status and residence permit.
Although citizenship has lost its distinctive primacy as a legal status that secures social
and civil rights, it may still be associated with national identity and the will to engage pol-
itically. For the immigrants who acquire it, citizenship may hold more than an instrumen-
tal function.
Citizenship and national identity
Public and academic discourse often uses the terms citizenship and national identity inter-
changeably (Simonsen 2017). For example, it is only by virtue of being part of the same
national community that we can justify paying taxes and support redistribution for the
benefit of strangers (Sindic 2011). Citizenship lends itself to being a basis for a social identity
as an institution that officially draws a line between those who hold the status and those who
do not. The membership of those who belong as opposed to those who do not is clearly
defined and conceptually charged. Criteria for naturalisation are illustrative. In the U.K.,
where these include a citizenship test on life in Britain, a language requirement and a cere-
monial oath to pledge allegiance to the crown, citizenship is not a neutral legal institution
that confers rights and duties, but it is also a symbolic one that delivers a conceptualisation
of what it means to be British. In his comparative work on France and Germany, Brubaker
(1994) highlights how citizenship is about national identity and argues that immigration has
triggered public discussions over citizenship acquisition policies, which are about what it
means to belong to the nation-state, not about what and who gains from citizenship acqui-
sition; ‘it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest’ (1994, 182). Survey data confirm
that the loyalty and affection for nations remain unchallenged by other forms of community,
such as a global or a European one (Heath and Roberts 2008; Smith and Jarkko 1998).
The nexus between national identity and citizenship may exist also for immigrants who
are not granted citizenship at birth, but who make the decision to naturalise. Identifying
with the country of residence can both be a reason for naturalising and a result of citizen-
ship acquisition. Alternatively, as immigrants usually hold a different citizenship status
and typically identify as belonging to another state, they may not be open to signing up
to British identity. As their stories of belonging are, to different extents, rooted in the
country of origin, they may view citizenship entirely as a legal status with attached benefits.
Nonetheless, a number of empirical studies focusing on particular countries or particu-
lar groups of immigrants in different national contexts, have found evidence of a link
between citizenship acquisition and national identification. Bevelander and Veenman
(2006) for the Netherlands, Platt (2014) and Manning and Roy (2010) for the U.K. find
that naturalised immigrants are more likely to identify with the host country compared
to non-naturalised immigrants. Reeskens and Wright (2013), and Karlsen and Nazroo’s
(2013) claim that citizen immigrants in the EU are more attached to the destination
country than non-citizens. This evidence suggests that, even if the host country does
not replace the home country, identification can gradually change over time (Casey and
Dustmann 2010).
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The cross-sectional nature of these studies prevents them from identifying the mech-
anisms at the heart of this relationship, which, potentially, goes both ways. As for any
social identity, social recognition is as fundamental as identification in shaping national
identity (Duveen 2001). Recognition of a social identity can take many forms, but its
absence jeopardises one’s self-definition (Hopkins and Blackwood 2011). Arguably, immi-
grants seek the legitimisation of their national identity embedded in legal institutions
when they already identify as British. It follows that I expect those who identify as
British to be more likely to later naturalise. The official recognition sanctioned by the pass-
port then completes the sense of national identity, which should therefore intensify. More-
over, as the state gives citizenship to a select group of applicants on strict conditions, we
can expect those who succeed to feel a stronger rightful claim to Britishness compared to
those who do not. I, therefore, expect citizenship to enhance the importance given to
immigrants’ British identity.
Citizenship and political engagement
Citizenship ensures political equality and representation by conferring the right to vote.
In democracies, non-citizens are not represented by the government and therefore do
not contribute to the governing of the state and to the legislative process. When funda-
mental rights and entitlements to benefits are protected by supra-national institutions,
voting and other more informal forms of national political participation may become
less pivotal in shaping policy. Arguably, this is especially the case for European citizens
and permanent residents whose rights are protected independently of citizenship status.
Nonetheless, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union (EU), which has resulted
in a surge in citizenship applications by European citizens, is a recent example of a pol-
itical upheaval that might affect the position of non-citizens who could not express
their preference in the referendum. Nations still represent the primary political frame-
work in which individuals assert their rights and have a claim on equality (Calhoun
2007).
Although citizenship grants the right to participate in the governing of the state, it
translates into political participation only if there is sufficient political engagement.
That is, people participate when they are sufficiently interested and knowledgeable
(Russo and Stattin 2017). It follows that on the one hand, the more politically engaged
immigrants may be more likely to naturalise in order to gain the right to vote. On the
other, the formal right to participate may trigger greater interest and acquisition of knowl-
edge. Cross-sectional evidence by Diehl and Blohm (2003) and Kesler and Demireva
(2011) for Europe, and by Leal (2002) for the U.S.A., tell us that on average naturalised
citizens are more interested in politics, are more likely to identify with a political party
in their country of residence, and to engage in a range of activities such as signing petitions
or joining protests.
There is evidence that voting is one of the reasons why immigrants naturalise for those
who are most politically engaged. A group of Prabhat’s (2018) respondents told her they
wanted to acquire British citizenship to be able to vote. Stewart and Mulvey (2011) also
find that among Scottish refugees political representation was a key motive for citizenship
application. Street (2017) for the U.K. and Kahanec and Tosun (2009) for Germany find
that that more politicised immigrants self-select into citizenship.
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However, if we see citizenship acquisition as a process of integration and assertion of
belonging, it may be to those who are less politically engaged that citizenship is a more
natural pathway. In the U.K., levels of political engagement are low among native
British citizens. Only two thirds of British citizens voted in the last few general elections
and even fewer vote in local and European elections (House of Commons Library 2017). It
follows that if those who are most integrated within British society are the ones most likely
to acquire citizenship, their level of political engagement should be relatively low. Heath
et al. (2013) argue that immigrants show higher levels of commitment to voting than
the British majority but that, with time, they tend to converge to similar levels. The
relationship between political engagement and naturalisation may therefore not be
clearcut.
In line with existing cross-sectional evidence, citizenship acquisition may also foster
political engagement. Citizenship is a legal resource that, by granting the formal right
to participate, may spark political interest and knowledge. Beyond the legal aspect tied
to the right to vote, citizenship is also closely tied to national identity and attachment
to the community. Citizenship may, therefore, represent a psychological resource for
people who feel like they belong to the polity and want to participate politically (Just
and Anderson 2012). Political engagement should, therefore, continue to grow following
naturalisation. Bevelander and Pendakur (2011) find that citizenship increases the prob-
ability of voting. Waldinger and Duquette-Rury (2016) find that Latino immigrants in the
U.S.A. become more politically invested in the host country after naturalisation, but
Levin’s (2013) analysis on the same population finds mixed results.
Although we would expect the right to vote to spark political engagement, we cannot
ignore the possibility that the anti-immigrant sentiment in political discourse over the
period considered may generate some form of cognitive dissonance. Immigrants who
identify as British and have been granted British citizenship may feel disillusioned and dis-
appointed by a political discourse that excludes them. Media representations and the pol-
itical climate make it particularly hard for certain groups of immigrants to feel included in
a British identity. For example, the redefinition and public representation of Britishness
have often explicitly juxtaposed British values presented as liberal with Islamic values por-
trayed as non-liberal (Sales 2010). Favell (2013) has also identified the ‘sociological reality’
of Eastern Europeans being at the bottom of a European hierarchy, despite enjoying the
same rights as other Europeans. Psychologists’ work on interest formation suggests that
social conditions are paramount to sustain interest development (Hidi and Ann Renninger
2006). Moreover, citizen immigrants may feel more exposed to hostility towards immi-
grants in general and disappointed by the political system and by the lack of opportunities
for social mobility (Levin 2013). If trust and political engagement are tightly linked, citizen
immigrants may be less inclined to engage with politics (Putnam 2000). This dissonance
between subjective perception of belonging and the political narratives and empirical rea-
lities of exclusion might push people to further disengage especially after the acquisition of
citizenship.
Moreover, research suggests that political behaviour forms during teenage years and does
not change much over the life course (Galston 2001; Schlozman, Jennings, and Niemi 1982).
Consistent with this, Street (2017) finds an effect of naturalisation on political engagement
only for immigrants who naturalise in early adulthood. If so, naturalisation in adulthood
may not affect immigrants’ existing disposition towards political engagement.
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Other determinants of naturalisation
Any analysis that investigates the relationship between national identification, political
engagement and citizenship acquisition needs to account for other determinants of and
barriers to citizenship. Research for different European countries and the U.S.A. finds
that years of residence, age and age at migration influence the likelihood of naturalisation,
indicating that duration of stay gives more opportunities and higher motivation to inte-
grate with the host population (e.g. Picot and Hou 2011 for North America; Vink,
Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers 2013 for 16 European countries). Arguably, immigrants of
a low socio-economic status face higher barriers to naturalisation. The application
process may be more daunting for people with low education levels and its cost may be
unaffordable for immigrants with low income. However, not all research has found evi-
dence of this. Fougère and Safi (2008), Chiswick and Miller (2008) are recent examples
of studies which do find this relationship for France and the U.S.A; while DeVoretz and
Pivnenko (2008) and Bevelander and Veenman (2006) do not for Canada and the
Netherlands.
Family ties in the host country may also indicate how anchored one is there. Evidence
suggests that immigrants in North America and in Europe who are married are more likely
to naturalise than single immigrants (Chiswick and Miller 2008; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and
Dronkers 2013; Yang 1994), especially if married to someone of the destination country’s
nationality (Bevelander and Veenman 2006). Evidence about having children is mixed.
Yang (1994) and Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013) find that it enhances the prob-
ability of naturalisation, but Bevelander and Veenman (2006) and Chiswick and Miller
(2008) do not. Country context could play a role in how the presence of children influ-
ences the decision to naturalise. In the U.K. a parent need not be naturalised for her/his
child to be entitled to citizenship. At the institutional level, several studies, mostly for
the U.S.A., find that the propensity to naturalise is lower for immigrants whose source
country has a high level of economic development and civil liberties, suggesting that
country of origin might affect the opportunity cost of choosing to naturalise (Mazzolari
2009; Picot and Hou 2011; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers 2013).
Net of these factors, I investigate immigrants’ degree of national identification and pol-
itical engagement, both before and after naturalisation.
Data and methods
Sample
I use Understanding Society (UKHLS) waves 1 (2009–2011) and 6 (2014–2016). The
UKHLS is a nationally representative household panel study that collects information
on people’s social and economic circumstances, attitudes, behaviours and health (Univer-
sity of Essex 2017). This longitudinal survey has collected annual information from
respondents from a sample of over 30,000 households first surveyed in 2009 and includes
interviews with all adult household members of original respondents at each sweep.
Understanding Society is particularly suitable for this study as it includes an ethnic min-
ority boost sample (EMBS) that focuses on the larger minority groups, Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black African. The sample design ensures that there are
at least 1,000 interviewees from each of these groups. Northern Ireland is excluded from
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the EMBS sample. Interviews are mostly conducted in English, but translation is also pro-
vided when requested (Knies 2018). Some questions, the ‘extra five minutes’, are specifi-
cally relevant to ethnic minority groups (e.g. identification with parents’ ethnicity) (Knies
2018) and are asked of a subsample of respondents (the EMBS sample, a comparison
sample from the main sample, and ethnic minority individuals living at wave 1 in areas
with relatively low proportions of minorities, which were therefore not covered by the
EMBS).
The population of interest for this paper is immigrants who did not have citizenship
when first observed in Understanding Society. I use the word immigrant to refer to
anyone not born in the U.K., although this includes people who have come to the U.K.
at different periods, more or less permanently, and for a variety of reasons and therefore
under different conditions. All U.K. born respondents are excluded from my analysis.
Wave 1 and wave 6 are the only interview rounds when citizenship status is recorded.
My initial sample comprises 997 immigrants who were not British citizens at wave 1 and
who responded to the survey at wave 6. Of these, 407 acquired citizenship after wave 1 and
before wave 6, and 590 did not. My sample, therefore, excludes immigrants who acquired
citizenship before wave 1. These have lived in the U.K. for longer on average, as the length
of stay is an important determinant of naturalisation (e.g. Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dron-
kers 2013). I further restrict the sample to immigrants who have been living in the U.K. for
at least two years by wave 1 because, by wave 6, they will have lived in the U.K. for at least
seven years, giving them enough time to be eligible for and attain citizenship.3 This is a
conservative way to select the population at risk of acquiring citizenship as there are
other cases where permanent residence/indefinite leave to remain status, that usually pre-
cedes the opportunity to make a citizenship application, is acquired more quickly or is not
necessary. As I use only complete cases,4 my analytical sample is reduced to 884 respon-
dents, 514 of whom remain non-citizens by wave 6 and 370 who acquire citizenship. Full
sample descriptive statistics are provided in Table S1 and Table S2 of the Supplementary
Material (SM).
If the respondents who drop out of the survey after wave 1 differ systematically from the
rest, estimates may be subject to attrition bias. For example, this might be the case if the
immigrants who leave the survey are the ones returning to their country of origin and who
would have therefore differed systematically from my sample in their likelihood of acquir-
ing citizenship. I apply wave 6 adult probability weights included in the dataset in order to
minimise the effects of attrition.
Measures
I outline the measures and then the methods for first investigating how far identification
and political engagement are associated with citizenship and second investigating how far
citizenship acquisition is associated with the identification and political engagement.
National identification and political engagement before citizenship acquisition
Dependent variable. Naturalisation: I derived this measure from wave 1 to wave 6 ques-
tions on whether the respondent is a U.K. citizen, citizen of their country of birth or citizen
of another country. I recoded the latter two categories into one, resulting in a dichotomous
variable that indicates whether (1) or not (0) the wave 1 respondent has acquired British
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 7
citizenship by wave 6. I make no distinction between those who hold dual nationality and
those who do not.
Independent variables of interest measured at wave 1. National identification: The
survey includes a question that asks what respondents consider their national identity
to be, with the available options Scottish, Welsh, English, British, Irish and other. I collapse
the first four nationalities under ‘British’. Answers can be given alone or in combination.
There are two resulting categories: ‘Other’ (0) if British nationality is not mentioned, and
‘British’ (1) if British nationality is mentioned alone or in combination with another
nationality. As a sensitivity check, I also measured national identification as ‘British
only’, ‘Other only’ and ‘British and other’; the results were robust to this alternative
specification.
Political engagement: I operationalise political engagement as the interest and knowl-
edge needed to engage in politics.
Interest in politics: Respondents are asked the extent to which they are interested in
politics on a four-item scale that ranges from ‘not at all’, to ‘very’.
Familiarity with the political system: I combine responses to questions aimed to gauge
whether the respondent has a preference for a political party or not. Respondents are first
asked if they support a political party and if their answer is negative, whether they feel a
little closer to one. The second question, therefore, nudges them to give a preference even
if they do not identify as supporters of any party. Given that the British political system is
almost a two-party system, even without supporting one of the two parties, it is fairly easy
to choose which one is closest to one’s beliefs. Hence these two questions measure knowl-
edge and familiarity with the political system as opposed to partisanship.
Other covariates measured at wave 1. Partnership and cohabitation status: I matched
information about cohabiting partners and spouses to create a variable in three categories:
single/no co-resident partner, with a non-U.K. born partner, with a U.K.-born partner.
Presence of children: I recoded the original survey question into a dichotomy of whether
the respondent is a parent of any children.
Children’s country of birth: I derived a variable that indicates whether at least one of the
respondent’s children was born in the U.K. I inferred this if the birth of any child took
place after a year of arrival to the U.K.
Employment status: I recoded the original survey question into three categories:
employed or self-employed, unemployed and economically inactive, which includes
respondents who are retired, studying full-time or in caring roles.
Household income: measured over the last month before the interview and divided by
1000 to aid interpretability.
Age left education: I derived the age at which the respondent left school or university, in
the U.K. or elsewhere.
Country of education: I derived an indicator of whether at least some of the respon-
dent’s education took place in the U.K. I imputed that this was the case if the respondent
left school/university after arriving to the U.K.
Language proficiency: I derive an indicator of whether the interview was translated or
conducted in English.
Home ownership: I derive a binary measure of whether the respondent lives in an
owned (including with a mortgage) or rented home.
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Years of residence: I measure the length of residence in the U.K. by the number of years
between arrival and the date of interview. As a sensitivity check, I allowed for non-linearity
by including it as a categorical variable. The results were robust to this alternative
specification.
Demographic variables: I include sex, age and age squared.
Region of origin: I use the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) of country of birth
instead of the country of birth itself because individual country sample sizes are very small.
HDI also allows to account for the higher incentive to naturalise for people of low-income
countries. I changed the scale from 0–1 to 0–100 to aid interpretation. I add an indicator of
whether respondents were born in a European country, which brings particular rights,
including freedom of movement across Europe, that might make naturalisation less
important, and whether they were born in a country that is part of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth comprises 53 states that are mostly former territories of the
British Empire. Although the British government stripped immigrants originally from
Commonwealth countries of their status of subjects to the British crown in 1981 (immi-
gration restrictions had already been introduced as of the 1960s), it left them full voting
rights. Irish, Cypriot and Maltese citizens are European citizens who have also had full
voting rights in the U.K. since 1949. I include a dummy to capture these nationalities
who are less incentivised to naturalise.
National identification and political engagement after citizenship acquisition
Dependent variable: The outcome variables are interest in politics, familiarity with the pol-
itical system and the importance given to being British in wave 6. Respondents are asked to
rate the importance they give to being British on a scale from 0 to 10 and where 11 is for
respondents who spontaneously state that they do not consider themselves as British. I
convert the scale to be from−1 to 10. I use this variable instead of the direct national identity
measure used in the first part of the analysis because the latter is only asked at wave
1. Although the importance of being British is included both in waves 1 and 6, in wave 1
it is only asked of the ‘extra five minutes’ subsample of respondents and of respondents
interviewed in the first 6 months of fieldwork, therefore, reducing sample size considerably.
Independent variable: The independent variable of interest is British citizenship status
in wave 6, which indicates if the respondent has naturalised between after wave 1 and
before wave 6.
Analytical approach
National identification and political engagement before citizenship acquisition
I estimate a probit regression model of the likelihood of naturalisation. With this method, I
jointly explore the relationship between national identification and political engagement,
and naturalisation. In addition to using weights, I also cluster standard errors by wave 1
household to avoid bias in standard error estimation arising from within-household error
correlation.
National identification and political engagement after citizenship acquisition
Addressing this part of the research question presents three main challenges related to the
lack of precise information on the date of naturalisation, which we only know happened in
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a window of time between before wave 1 and after wave 6. First, it is possible that any
change in national identification and political engagement between waves 1 and 6,
measured at wave 6, has occurred or started before naturalisation. For the respondents
for whom this is the case, my analysis overestimates the effect of naturalisation. Second,
it is possible that any change in national identification and political engagement
between waves 1 and 6 affects the likelihood of naturalisation. That is, it drives natu-
ralisation and remains constant thereafter. Third, there could be unobserved drivers of
both naturalisation as well as national identification and political engagement.
However, since wave 6 outcomes are also measured at wave 1, i.e. before naturalisation,
I can control for time-invariant unobservables that affect national identification and
political engagement, therefore reducing bias and estimating the net effect of citizenship
acquisition. Nonetheless, time-varying unobservables may still affect national identifi-
cation and political engagement in wave 6. For instance, the current state of British
politics could influence both the willingness to naturalise and engagement with
British politics.
Despite these data limitations, which limit the extent to which I can make causal claims,
the data make it possible to observe the change in national identification and political
engagement between waves and its relationship with citizenship acquisition. I use
inverse-probability weighted regression-adjustment (IPWRA), a combination of matching
and regression, whereby parametric regression is applied to matched data. I employ
matching as opposed to regression alone because, by comparing respondents in the treat-
ment group (i.e. those who acquired citizenship) and control group (i.e. those who did not
acquire citizenship) with similar observed characteristics, it avoids areas where there is no
overlap of covariates between the treatment and control group, a scenario where
regression alone has been shown to perform poorly (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Glazerman
et al. 2003). Moreover, IPWRA is doubly robust if either one of the specifications of the
prediction model of the treatment, naturalisation (estimated with matching) or of the
outcome, national identification and political engagement (estimated with regression),
is correctly specified. IPWRA, therefore, decreases the sensitivity of the estimated
average treatment effect (ATE), the difference in mean outcomes, to the particular specifi-
cation (Hill and Reiter 2006; Ho et al. 2007). As suggested by Stuart (2010) and Schafer
and Kang (2008), using matching methods jointly with regression adjustment also
reduces bias and increases efficiency compared to matching alone. Employing regression
adjustment after matching ‘cleans up’ residual covariate imbalance between the treatment
and control group, therefore minimising the bias related to observables (Stuart 2010).
Finally, it provides a host of diagnostics that help to assess the quality of the model. A
step-by-step breakdown of the analysis can be found in SM.
I estimate three separate models of the effect of citizenship acquisition on each outcome
measure. For each one, I estimate both the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET). The ATE estimates the effect of citizenship acqui-
sition for the entire population of immigrants, both those who do and those who do not
acquire citizenship. The ATET estimates the effect of citizenship acquisition only for the
immigrants who do acquire citizenship. Details of covariate balance checks and successful
common support assumption testing can be found in the SM.
For both sets of analyses, I focus on my discussion of results on the variables of interest
and report key results in graphical form. Full tables of results are provided in the SM.
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Results
National identification and political engagement before citizenship acquisition
Figure 1 presents the average marginal probabilities of naturalisation by wave 6 for the key
independent variables of interest, adjusting for other covariates. The full set of results from
the probit regression can be found in the SM, Table S3. Identification as British, interest in
politics and familiarity with the political system, all appear to matter in the decision to
naturalise. Figure 1 shows that immigrants who identify as British, or as both British
and another nationality, have an average marginal probability of 12 percentage points
higher than that for immigrants who identify only with another nationality. For many suc-
cessful applicants, identification as British takes place before citizenship acquisition. This
finding suggests that net of other drivers and barriers, identifying as British provides
immigrants with a motive to naturalise. These findings are consistent with theories of
social identity that illustrate the role of social recognition in identity formation
(Hopkins and Blackwood 2011). Arguably, immigrants who identify as British seek
social and official recognition through citizenship acquisition. This form of acceptance
may be particularly important to more marginalised groups who may feel their British
identification is not matched by general public endorsement.
As regards political engagement, the more immigrants are interested in politics, the less
likely they are to naturalise. The effect is large, with those very interested in politics being 23
percentage points less likely to become citizens than those who are not at all interested.
However, immigrants who are more familiar with the British political system are more
likely to naturalise. The combination of these results may be puzzling at first because we
would expect the two dimensions of political engagement to work in the same direction.
Figure 1. Average marginal effects of national identification and political engagement.
Notes: Average marginal effects computed after the probit model of the probability of acquiring British citizenship with
clustered standard errors and weights. Circles show point estimates and the horizontal lines delineate 95% confidence
intervals. Circles without horizontal lines show reference categories. Estimates control for sex, age, age squared, years
of residence, HDI of country of origin, Europe indicator, Commonwealth indicator, gross household income, home owner-
ship, age left education, whether any education in the U.K., presence of children, whether any children born in the U.K.,
partnership status, employment status, language proficiency.
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Reflection on what the two variables are measuring may help to explain these patterns.
Familiarity with the political system is a necessary condition for political participation.
Becoming familiar with the country’s political parties may not necessarily provide motiv-
ation for naturalisation, but might nevertheless signal a certain degree of integration.
Without actively seeking this information, we can expect most people who read or
watch the news and who have built ties with natives, to have some knowledge of British
political parties. Sufficient knowledge of the British political system is also required to
pass The Life in the U.K. test, a condition for Indefinite Leave to Remain or naturalisation.
Immigrants who are more familiar with the British political system are therefore more
likely to be those who self-select into citizenship. Importantly, this familiarity is necessary
for later participation, enabled by the right to vote associated with citizenship.
In contrast, it is more difficult to interpret what the question on interest in politics is
actually measuring. In light of the negative relationship with naturalisation, one possibility
is that non-U.K. born respondents interpret the question with reference to their home
country rather than to the U.K. If this were the case, it would mean that those who are
more interested in the politics of their home country are less likely to naturalise.
However, further investigation suggests this is not the explanation. First, if respondents
thought about their country of origin in their answer to the interest in politics question,
I would expect the immigrants most interested in politics to be the least familiar with
the political system. However, the positive association between the two variables indicates
otherwise (Table S4 in the SM). Secondly, I test whether there is a correlation between
identifying only as a national of a country that is not the U.K. and higher interest in poli-
tics. The result of a simple t-test shows that the relationship is the opposite. The immi-
grants who identify as British, or as both British and another nationality as opposed to
another nationality only, are significantly more interested in politics (Table S5 in the SM).
Alternatively, the survey question may evoke an interest in geo-politics that stretches
beyond well-defined geographical borders and that leads people to be less invested and
potentially critical of investment in naturalisation in a specific country. The lack of this
awareness of those who are relatively less interested in politics may even be helpful in fos-
tering the propensity to naturalise.
Finally, this finding may indicate that the immigrants who later naturalise have inte-
grated more into British society than those who do not. As discussed, integration into
British culture might equate to lower engagement with British politics. The British
Social Attitudes survey provides evidence of an increasing disconnection with politics
and a general voter apathy since the turn of the millennium (Phillips and Simpson
2015). On a similar question about interest in British politics in the same period 2009/
2010, they report that only one third of respondents expressed a ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great
deal’ of interest in politics (Butt and Curtice 2013). I compare how new citizens, non-citi-
zens, those who already acquired citizenship before wave 1, and native citizens are rep-
resented on the ‘interest in politics’ scale. Remarkably, for all groups, the majority say
they are either ‘not at all’, or ‘not very’ interested in politics. The group with the
highest proportion of respondents expressing they are ‘very’ interested in politics is that
of non-citizens (Table S6 in the SM).
Although all respondents become eligible for naturalisation by wave 6, some are eligible
for more time than others. As a sensitivity check for this, I re-estimate the model on a
restricted sample of immigrants who were already eligible for citizenship at wave 1, i.e.
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they had been living in the U.K. for at least six years. Results are consistent with previous
estimates (Table S7 in the SM).
National identification and political engagement after citizenship acquisition
The second part of my analysis examines whether citizenship is a resource that fosters
national identification and political engagement in British society. Figure 2 shows that immi-
grants who naturalise are not more likely to be familiar with the British political system. This
is probably due to the more knowledgeable people having already self-selected into citizen-
ship and to the variable not measuring the degree of familiarity, but merely if there is any
familiarity or not. Figure 2 does, however, show that after naturalisation, citizens report a
lower level of interest in politics than non-citizens. That is, other things being equal, not
only the least interested in politics self-select into citizenship, but their interest continues
to decrease thereafter. This finding is consistent with Bartram’s (2019) analysis using the
same data, but different methodological approaches. He argues that the requirements for
naturalisation (tests and ceremonies) are to blame for the decrease in political interest.
However, this explanation seems speculative. Importantly, it fails to take account of the
fact that, as I have shown here, interest in politics is lower for citizens than non-citizens
even before citizenship acquisition takes place. Moreover, the ‘citizenship’ tests are a require-
ment not only to attain citizenship for EU nationals, but they are also required to attain
Indefinite Leave to Remain for non-EU U.K. residents, whether or not they subsequently
apply for citizenship. Alternatively, it is plausible that the contrast between identifying as
British and being a British national but being excluded by the political discourse which con-
tinues to associate immigrants with being non-British, pushes naturalised citizens further
away from being engaged with the political world (Sales 2010). Especially after the strenuous
Figure 2. The ATE and ATET of the acquisition of citizenship on the probability of being familiar with
the British political system and the degree of interest in politics.
Notes: Average treatment effects (ATE) and average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) estimated through inverse-
probability weighted regression-adjustment (IPWRA) on the likelihood of being familiar with the political system and
on the degree of interest in politics. Circles/diamonds show point estimates and the horizontal lines delineate 95% confi-
dence intervals.
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process of naturalisation, those who already feel and are British may resent such non-accep-
tance and therefore dissociate from the political system that fosters it (Prabhat 2018).
As expected, immigrants who naturalise give higher importance to their identity as
British by around 1 point on a scale from −1 to 10 compared to those who do not. As
shown in Figure 3, this is true both for the ATE and ATET. Although I cannot confidently
say that the growth in the importance given to being British followed naturalisation, the
finding reveals that growth in British identification occurs in association with naturalis-
ation. The finding also suggests that, although immigrants who naturalise were found
to already identify more as British before naturalising, their sense of identity strengthens
once they gain official recognition. The fact that the application process is costly and chal-
lenging might also contribute to creating a feeling of satisfaction and pride for those who
are successful in attaining citizenship and may feed into boosting the importance given to
their British identity.
Conclusion
Much of the discontent with multiculturalist policies in Europe concerns the lack of social
cohesion between minority and majority groups under a common national identity (Koop-
mans 2013). Identifying as nationals of the country one lives in and engaging politically is
important both for individuals’ wellbeing and for the sake of society’s functioning. In this
paper, I asked if immigrants naturalise once they already feel and act as citizens. I find
that they do. They feel British, they are familiar with the British political system and are
as disengaged with politics as the average native population. I also asked whether citizenship
contributes to immigrants’ growth as citizens. I find that their identity as British nationals
strengthens and that their interest in politics continues to decline.
These findings raise questions about what being a citizen means. From a theoretical
conceptualisation of citizenship, it is difficult to make sense of why interest in politics
Figure 3. The ATE and ATET of the acquisition of citizenship on the extent to which the respondent
deems being British as important.
Notes: Average treatment effects (ATE) and average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) estimated through inverse-
probability weighted regression-adjustment (IPWRA) on the degree of importance given to British identity. Circles/dia-
monds show point estimates and the horizontal lines delineate 95% confidence intervals.
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of immigrants who later acquire citizenship is significantly lower than for those who do
not and why it continues to drop thereafter. Moreover, this finding is in contrast with evi-
dence from other country contexts for which there is a positive association between pol-
itical engagement and citizenship acquisition (e.g. Kesler and Demireva 2011). However,
by considering that the average native citizen is not very interested in politics and does not
participate in Britain’s political life, I argue that low interest in politics is an indication of
integration, rather than marginalisation. I also suggest that the further decline in interest
in politics may signal disillusionment with a political narrative that excludes immigrants
irrespective of their citizenship status and fails to recognise their status and identity as
British nationals.
This raises methodological and conceptual questions, both for researchers and for
policy makers. Firstly, as political disaffection is high in most Western countries, how
far does it make sense to regard political engagement as a defining features of citizenship?
Secondly, when we study immigrant populations, what reference group should we
compare them to, the ideal or the real? This last question is directed to policy makers
as much as researchers. Policy makers dictate conditions for naturalisation, including a
test that asks questions that most native British people are unlikely to know the answer
to. The 3000 facts test-takers are expected to know, include about 278 historical dates,
the height of the London Eye and the number of elected representatives in each regional
assembly, for example. For researchers, it is important to be mindful that the choice of a
comparison-group against which we measure immigrants implies judgments of ‘success-
ful’ and ‘failed’ integration on which we base notions of good citizenship (Bloemraad, Kor-
teweg, and Yurdakul 2008).
In contrast, the link between citizenship and national identification that exists for
natives, appears to exist for immigrants too. This is in line with cross-sectional evidence
of a nexus, both in Britain and other European countries (Manning and Roy 2010; Platt
2014). However, by distinguishing between national identity before and after naturalis-
ation, this study contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms behind this relation-
ship. I argue that social recognition is an indispensable facet of identity formation and
might explain why the immigrants who identify as British naturalise, and why their
sense of identity continues to grow thereafter. This study also adds to the growing evidence
that national identification tends to increase with time (Georgiadis and Manning 2013;
Güveli and Platt 2011; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013). While we should not forget that
other social representations, such as those used in the media and in everyday life, also
affect immigrants’ identity, this finding suggests that citizenship is still a valuable
marker of national identity. This should be a reassuring finding to those worried about
first and second generations failing to embrace a British national identity (Cameron
2011). If citizens, who can vote and are permanent members of nation states, identify
as nationals of the country they live in, they are more likely to feel committed to the pol-
itical community for a common good, contributing to the social cohesion of the country
(Calhoun 2002; Moran 2011).
More geographically fine-grained evidence is needed to investigate whether immi-
grants’ political engagement mirrors that of natives in different parts of the country.
Studying other country contexts with longitudinal data, with particular attention to the
variation in naturalisation policies, could also improve our understanding of the relation-
ship between citizenship, political engagement and national identity.
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Notes
1. However, the British naturalisation rate, which takes account of the immigrant population
size, is similar to the European average (around 2%) (Eurostat 2019).
2. An exception in the UK is Commonwealth and Irish citizens who have full voting rights in
the UK.
3. Different routes to citizenship typically require six years of residence.
4. With the exception of ‘the importance of being British’ variable which is part of the ‘extra five
minute’ questions, asked by design to a subsample of immigrants only.
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